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COMMENTS

STRICT PRODUCT LIABILITY SUITS FOR
DESIGN DEFECTS IN MILITARY PRODUCTS:
ALL THE KING'S MEN; ALL THE KING'S

PRIVILEGES?
I.

INTRODUCTION

The 1984 United States Defense Department budget totalled
187,490.7 million dollars.' Congress targeted 88,259.9 million dollars
of that sum for the procurement of aircraft, missiles, combat vehicles,
ammunition, torpedoes, submarines, and other military weapons and
equipment from private industry.' The budget also included 27,303
million dollars for research, development, testing, and evaluation of
products,$ much of which will also be conducted by private concerns.
This military hardware, like nonmilitary products, may contain design
defects which would normally result in the manufacturer-seller shouldering the liability for any personal or property damage the defect
caused. However, the contractors who are the recipients of 100 billion
1. Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-94, 97 Stat. 614
(1983).
2. Id. In the proposed 1985 defense budget, the total budget rises to 264 billion dollars. As
Defense Billions Pour into the Economy, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 12, 1984, at 57, 57.
While staggering amounts are involved, the spending is concentrated on only a few companies. For
example, twenty-five prime contractors received more than half of the Defense Department's business in 1983. Id. The contractors with the largest defense orders in 1983, and the total amount of
such orders, are as follows: General Dynamics, $6.8 billion; McDonnell Douglas, $6.1 billion;
Rockwell International, $4.5 billion; General Electric, $4.5 billion; Boeing, $4.4 billion; Lockheed,
$4.0 billion; United Technologies, $3.9 billion; Tenneco, $3.8 billion; Howard Hughes Medical
Institute, $3.2 billion; and Raytheon, $2.7 billion. Id. at 58.
Among industries, aerospace and electronics account for much of the work. Of the top one
hundred prime contractors, twenty-seven are in the aerospace industry, while twenty are in the
electronics field. Id. For many companies, government defense contract work is their biggest business. For example, almost ninety percent of General Dynamic's business is with the military. Id.
3. Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-94, 97 Stat. 614
(1983).
4. Product liability actions encompass three distinct theories of liability: negligence, breach
of warranty, and strict liability. I R. HURSH & H. BAILEY, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1:3 (2d ed. 1974). The focus herein is primarily on strict liability actions and, in particular,
on actions premised upon an alleged design defect in a military product. Strict product liability
actions may also arise from allegations of a manufacturing defect or the failure to warn of a
danger associated with the product. Id. at §§ 4:12-13.
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dollars in annual revenue by way of government contracts disclaim any
responsibility for the damages their products cause. They argue that
they designed the products in accordance with government specifications, and because the government is immune from liability in actions
based on strict product liability, they also should be immune.5
On the other hand, the individuals injured by the products may
receive little or no compensation for their losses if the contractors can
share the government's immunity. Sovereign immunity bars all actions
against the federal government based on strict product liability and
also bars some actions based on negligence in the design of the product.6 While military and civilian employees may qualify for some benefits under federal laws analogous to state workers' compensation laws,
nonemployees are not able to recover any of their losses unless the government has waived its immunity."
Consequently, when the courts permit the manufacturers to share
the government's immunity, the injured individual is left without a
remedy in a situation where normal tort principles would provide for
recovery. While the United States Supreme Court has recently denied
a writ of certiorari in a case presenting the issue of whether a manufac-

turer can be immune in a strict product liability action in admiralty,'
the lower state and federal courts are split on the applicability and

The elements of any type of strict product liability action vary widely from jurisdiction to
RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). contains the most commonly accepted elements. Comment, Product Liability: The Problem of the Non-Designing Manufacturer, 9 U. DAYTON L. REv. 81, 85-86 (1983). The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
402A (1965) provides that:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user
or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to
the ultimate consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a -product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
Hence, in order to prove a prima facie case in most jurisdictions, the plaintiff must show that the
defendant sold the product, that it contained a defect, and (according to most authorities) that it
was in an unreasonably dangerous condition at the time it left the defendant's control, and that
such condition caused the injuries that the plaintiff suffered. R. HURSH & H. BAILEY, supra note
4, at § 4:10.
5. See infra notes 66-80 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 16-24 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
8. McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
711 (1984).

jurisdiction, but the
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scope of what has been misnamed the "government contract defense." 9
A clear majority of these courts have recognized the defense in actions
where the plaintiff has alleged a design defect in military hardware. 10
Arguably, neither legal precedent nor sound policy reasons justifies this
judicial phenomenon. However, there are no simple solutions to the
complex problems presented when military products manufactured according to government specifications contain design defects.
Section II of this comment examines the potential remedies available to the plaintiff and the contractor in an action against the government, which illustrates the relative abilities of the parties to bear, shift,
and minimize the loss absent the government contract defense. Section
III sets forth the legal and policy arguments which support the defense
and those which militate against it. Finally, proposed federal legislation
creating immunity for the contractor in limited situations provides a
starting point for an analysis of the alternatives to the current system
of loss allocation."
II.

THE GOVERNMENT AS A POTENTIAL DEFENDANT

Like private commercial manufacturing contracts, government
contracts for the procurement of military hardware contain specifications setting forth the characteristics of the product the government
requires. Unlike private contracts, however, federal procurement regulations limit the ability of both parties to negotiate over the terms of
the contract, including the design. The government's control over the
design varies considerably from case to case, depending on the type of
product and the type of contract. The government awards contracts after either formally advertising for bids or negotiating with select manufacturers.1 2 In the former case, the government provides design specifications, performance specifications, or purchase descriptions; sometimes

9. The doctrine is not a defense, but rather an immunity. Courts and commentators have
uniformly discussed the doctrine under the heading of the "Government Contract Defense." For
convenience, this comment uses the same terminology.
10. See infra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 185-92 and accompanying text.
12. Checchi, Federal Procurement and Commercial Procurement under the U.C.C.-A
Comparison, 11 Pun. Corr. L.J. 358, 362 (1980). Federal regulations, such as the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) and the Defense Acquisition Regulations (DAR), require the formal
advertising procedure whenever feasible. See R. NASH, JR., GOVERNMENT CONTRACT CHANGES
40 (1975). However, United States Representative Jim Courter (N.J.), a member of the House
Armed Services Committee, has recently argued that a majority of Defense Department contracts
are awarded following private negotiations with individual companies rather than after open competitive bidding. Giving the Pentagon an Economic Lesson, NATION'S Bus., Dec. 1983, at 16, 16.
Courter and United States Senator Charles Grassley (Iowa), have proposed a bill that would
require increases of five percent annually in the level of the Pentagon's acquistion of goods
through competitive bidding in order "to bring waste, fraud and abuse under control." Id.
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it provides a hybrid of all three.13 Contractors must comply with the
specifications in framing their bids and in performing the contract."
On the other hand, negotiated contracts contain a request for proposals
which includes references to applicable specifications and permits contractors to submit alternatives to the specifications that the government
may accept, with or without modification, or reject.1 5 Consequently, in
every case, the government plays a role in creating the design which
allegedly injured the plaintiff and thus it emerges as a potential
defendant.
A.

The Plaintiffs Remedies

Assuming that the procured product contains a design defect, the
plaintiff faces two obstacles that preclude recovery from the government in an action based on strict product liability. First, the government rarely qualifies as a seller of the product. Rather, it is normally
the buyer of the product.' Second, in those cases in which the government has resold the product, sovereign immunity bars any action predicated on strict liability.1 7 The fact that the government is rarely a seller
13. The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals divides government specifications into
three categories. Design specifications state "precise measurements, tolerances, materials, in-process and finished product tests, quality control and inspection requirements and other information." Aerodex, Inc., 1962 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 3492, at 17,822, rev'd on other grounds, 417 F.2d
1361 (Ct. CI. 1969). Performance specifications state the performance characteristics desired for
an item (e.g., a vehicle can attain fifty miles per hour). The design is irrelevant so long as the
performance requirement is met, leaving the contractor with the "general responsibility for design." Id. However, the government retains the right of final inspection. Id. Finally, a purchase
description may be used, such as a brand name, model number, or comparable product. This
description can only be used when more detailed specifications are not feasible. Id. However, one
author has noted that "almost all contracts contain mixed specifications including elements of all
three types." R. NASH, supra note 12, at 273.
14. Formal advertised procurement requires an award to the lowest responsive and responsible bidder. R. NASH, supra note 12, at 523. The government may also insist on strict compliance
with contract terms. Dynamometer Co. v. United States, 386 F.2d 855, 868 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
15. J. PAUL, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS AND SUBCONTRACTS 143, 163
(1964).
16. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text. But see Casabianca v. Casabianca, 104
Misc. 2d 348, 428 N.Y.S.2d 400 (Sup. Ct. 1980) (plaintiff severely injured hand in dough mixer
which was located in father's pizza shop, but which was formerly used in World War II field

kitchens).
17. The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA) as precluding suits based on strict liability theory. Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 799
(1972). While the plaintiffs in Laird predicated their suit upon a theory of strict liability for an
ultrahazardous activity, the lower courts have extended the Court's logic to find that sovereign
immunity also bars suits in strict product liability. See, e.g.. Stewart v. United States, 486 F.
Supp. 178 (C.D. III. 1980) (sovereign immunity precludes strict product liability suit for failure to
warn by government as seller of asbestos); In re Bomb Disaster, 438 F. Supp. 769 (E.D. Cal.
1977) (government did not waive sovereign immunity in strict product liability suits by enacting.
the FTCA; therefore, plaintiff cannot recover on this ground for damages due to explosion of
boxcars).
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of military products and the plaintiff rarely a buyer of them means that
a breach of warranty claim would also fail for lack of privity.
Therefore, the plaintiff's only hope for recovery from the government in a product liability case depends upon the availability of an
action in negligence. The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) 18 permits
suits against the federal government based upon negligence with three
relevant exceptions. First, the FTCA does not extend to any claim arising out of the combatant activities of the armed services during time of
war. 1 9 Next, the Feres20 doctrine bars all primary and derivative claims
for injuries sustained by service members incident to active military
service.2 Finally, the "discretionary function" exception'2 bars many
claims by nonmilitary plaintiffs who allege negligence in the design of a
military product.
The United States Supreme Court in Dalehite v. United States,'2
considered the applicability of the discretionary function exception to
government specifications in an action based on injuries caused by an
explosion of ammonium nitrate fertilizer produced and shipped under
the government's control. In analyzing the reach of the government's
immunity, the Court made a distinction between decisions at the planning level (no waiver of immunity) and those at the operational level
(waiver of immunity). It held that the exception bars suits based upon
determinations of a discretionary nature made by executives and administrators in "establishing plans, specifications or schedules of operation."" When the courts allow the contractors to share the govern-

18. Act of Aug. 6, 1946, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842 (codified primarily at 28 U.S.C. § 2671-80
(1982)).
19. 28 U.S.C. § 2680() (1982).
20. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
21. The Court held that there was no cause of action stated for the death or injury of
service personnel caused by the negligence of other members of the armed services. Id. at 146.
22. The discretionary function exception states that the government is immune from liability for
[any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or
regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or
perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of
the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.
28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1982).
23. 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
24. Id. at 35-36. Compare Dalehite with Stanley v. United States, 347 F. Supp. 1088 (D.
Me. 1972) (design of radio tower without guardrail not a discretionary function unless related to
policy considerations underlying decision to engage in activity), vacated on other grounds, 476
F.2d 606 (1st Cir. 1973), and Moyer v. Martin Marietta Corp., 481 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1973)
(selection of aircraft by Air Force secretary was discretionary, but acceptance of aircraft system
was not). Basically, the lower courts have found no waiver when the design reflects a government
policy decision, but otherwise permit liability. For example, the decision to utilize a bulldozer
without a protective canopy guard in a particular project is not a discretionary function. United
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ment's immunity in this regard, the contractor will also be immune.
In addition to suits premised upon product liability under the
FTCA, government employees may recover benefits for injuries that
arise out of the course of their employment in accordance with federal
statutes that are analogous to state workers' compensation legislation.
The Federal Employees Compensation Act (FECA)' 3 covers civilian
employees, and contains an express clause stating that recovery under
FECA precludes recovery under the FTCA.16 The Veterans' Benefit
Act 27 provides compensation for military employees injured in the
course of their employment. The United States Supreme Court relied
upon the existence of this latter act as one reason for holding that the
FTCA does not extend to claims arising from injuries incident to military service.28 Hence, recovery under the Veterans' Benefit Act is also
an exclusive remedy. Some relief may also be available via special legislation such as the Swine Flu Act 29 or the Military Claims Act.5 0
B.

The Contractor's Remedies

A contractor that has paid damages to a plaintiff due to injuries
caused by a product the contractor manufactured in accordance with
government specifications has two potential remedies against the government, one sounding in tort and the other in contract. The contractor
may recover the damages it paid the plaintiff by way of a claim for tort
indemnifications1 in those cases where the plaintiff could have recovered damages from the government under the FTCA.5 ' For example,

States v. DeCamp, 478 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 924 (1973). However, the
decision to order jeeps without seatbelts to facilitate quick escapes is discretionary. Sanner v. Ford
Motor Co., 144 N.J. Super. 1, 364 A.2d 43 (Law Div. 1976), affd, 154 N.J. Super. 407, 381
A.2d 805 (App. Div. 1977), certification denied, 75 N.J. 616, 384 A.2d 846 (1978).
25. 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-93 (1982).
26. Id. § 8116(c).
27. 28 U.S.C. §§ 101-5228 (1982).
28. Fetes, 340 U.S. at 144-45.
29. National Swine Flu Immunization Program of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 247(j) (1976 & Supp.
V 1981). The act arose after vaccine manufacturers refused to aid in the immunization program
designed to avoid a predicated swine flu epidemic on the grounds that their insurers refused to
underwrite strict product liability policies. Hunt v. United States, 636 F.2d 580, 589-90 (D.C.
Cir. 1980).
30. 10 U.S.C. §§ 2731-37 (1982). This act permits settlement of claims in the maximum
amount of $25,000 for damage to persons or property caused by certain employees of the military
acting within the scope of their employment. Id. § 2733(a).
31. Indemnity has been defined as follows:
A person who, in whole or in part, has discharged a duty which is owed by him but
which as between himself and another should have been discharged by the other, is entitled
to indemnity from the other, unless the payor [indemniteel is barred by the wrongful nature of his conduct.
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION

32.

§ 76 (1936).

Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v United

States,
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol10/iss1/6
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the contractor could not recover damages it paid on a claim due to
injuries incident to military service,"3 but could recover payments to
nongovernmental employees.' In a surprise move,35 the United States
Supreme Court recently held in Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United

States"6 that an indemnification claim was possible for payments to civilian employees who had received FECA benefits, despite the fact that
the employees had no claim against the government under the FTCA. 7
As a result of these limits, indemnification is not available in those situations where the plaintiff cannot recover tort damages from the government and is most likely to sue the contractor.
The contractor's most viable remedy against the government is
contractual indemnification. Congress has provided contractors with a
right of indemnification in various situations. Peripherally, there are
numerous statutes creating indemnification in narrowly defined situations."3 Also, research or development contracts may provide for indemStates v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543 (1951)).
33. Stencel, 431 U.S. at 666. In Stencel, the plaintiff was injured when the egress lifesupport system of his F-100 fighter aircraft malfunctioned during a midair emergency. Id. The
plaintiff received a $1,500-a-month lifetime pension under the Veterans Benefit Act and then sued
both the government and Stencel. Stencel had supplied the system to North American Rockwell,
the prime contractor, and consequently had no contract with the government, precluding its use of
the government contract defense. Stencel settled with the plaintiff's estate for $207,500. Insurance
covered the entire claim. Hearingon H.R. 1504 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and
Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,97th Cong., 1st Sess., 28 (1981).
Stencel cross-claimed against the government for indemnification. It had discovered design
problems in the parachute pack while testing the product and urged the Air Force to change the
design in order to eliminate the problem. The Air Force refused and Stencel produced the system
according to the government's specifications. Id. at 9-30. The Air Force conceded that the plaintiff's death was due to the defect Stencel had discovered. The United States Supreme Court
granted the government's motion for summary judgment against the plaintiff and its motion to
dismiss Stencel's cross-claim for indemnification based upon Feres, 340 U.S. 135. Stencel, 431
U.S. at 672. See supra note 21 for an explanation of the Feres doctrine.
United States Senator Charles Grassley (Iowa), the sponsor of a bill which would provide
immunity for both contractors and subcontractors in certain actions where the product conformed
to government specifications, has pointed to Stencel as the main reason why federal legislation is
needed. 129 CONG. REc. S12216 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1983). However, based upon the current
status of the law, Stencel is the exception and not the rule. The courts have shielded contractors
from liability while permitting suits against subcontractors.
34. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed sub nom.,
United Air Lines, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 951 (1964). The decision in Lockheed Aircraft
Corp. v. United States, 460 U.S. 190 (1983) modifies the United Air Lines decision to the extent
that the court denied indemnity for payments to civilian employees.
35. In addition to the court in United Air Lines, other lower courts had also denied indemnity for payments to civilian employees. See, e.g., Galimi v. Jetco, Inc., 514 F.2d 949 (2d Cir.
1975); Travelers Ins. Co. v. United States, 493 F.2d 881 (3d Cir. 1974).
36. 460 U.S. 190 (1983).
37. Id. at 199.
38. For example, the Price-Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1982), creates a right of indemnification for liability arising from nuclear acts, and the Agricultural Act of 1970, 7 U.S.C. §
450(j)-(1) (1982), creates a right of indemnification for dairy products contaminated by nuclear
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nification of contractors and subcontractors for personal and property
damage to third parties that arises from a risk which the contract identifies as unusually hazardous, which arises out of the direct performance of the contract, and which is not compensated for by insurance or
otherwise.3 9 Public Law 85-8044" also permits the Defense Department
to agree to indemnify contractors and subcontractors for amounts paid
for third party claims when the department decides that it will facilitate national defense and the contract involves an unusually hazardous
risk or a nuclear risk.
However, contractor efforts to convince federal agencies to include
standard indemnification clauses in federal contracts have failed to
date, 41 despite contractor complaints that the current statutory scheme
is too narrow to fulfill its objective of insulating contractors from liability in potentially high-risk undertakings.4 2 The government counters
these complaints by pointing out that considerable competition exists
for government contracts despite limited indemnification, and that
broader provisions would reduce the contractors' economic incentive to
design and produce the safest possible products.4 3
In summary, the contractor's tort remedies against the government
are nearly equal to those of the injured plaintiff and can be more inclusive, as in the Lockheed" case. Additionally, a contractor may be able
to recover under a contract theory from the government in a narrow set
of circumstances. The extensive limits on recovery in actions by plaintiffs and cofitractors who sue the government result in the government
ultimately absorbing only a small portion of the damages for military
product-related injuries. Consequently, responsibility for the brunt of
those damages falls upon the contractors and the plaintiffs. The government contract defense is a crucial factor in allocating the loss between
these two parties. When applicable, the plaintiff bears the entire loss;
when inapplicable, the loss shifts to the contractor and, presumably, to
radiation or toxic chemicals.
39. 10 U.S.C. § 2354(a) (1982).
40. 50 U.S.C. § 1431-1435 (1982) (commonly known as Public Law 85-804). Unlike 10
U.S.C. § 2354(a), Public Law 85-804 is not limited to research and development contracts.
Neither statute is consistently applied. Some agencies are reluctant to utilize their indemnification
power, primarily because they do not want to classify the work as "unusually hazardous." Comment, Catastrophic Accidents: Indemnification of Contractors, 10 J. SPACE LAW 1, 10 (1982).
41. Industry Groups Want Indemnity Reform, but Justice Department Favors Status.Quo,
10 PROD. SAFETY & LIAB. REP. (BNA) 693, 694 (Oct. 15, 1982) (testimony of National Association of Manufacturers spokesman T. Richard Brown before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee
on Agency Administration) [hereinafter cited as Industry Groups].
42. Id.
43. Id. at 694 (testimony of Assistant Attorney General J. Paul McGrath).
44. 460 U.S. 190.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol10/iss1/6
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its insurer, and is thereby spread across a wide segment of society.'

III.

THE CONTRACTOR AS A POTENTIAL DEFENDANT

The plaintiff who seeks to recover damages for injuries due to a
design defect from a contractor which has complied with the government's contract specifications faces two hurdles to recovery.' 6 The first
is what one commentator has labeled the "contract specification defense,"'47 and the second is the government contract defense. Both,
neither, or only one of these defenses may apply in a single case, depending on the jurisdiction and the law which governs.
A.

The Contract Specification Defense

The contract specification defense first surfaced in negligence actions involving both private and public contracts in which it did not
operate as a defense at all .' Rather, the doctrine amounted to a restatement of the principle that a contractor did not breach its duty of
care to the plaintiff if it followed the plans of another (in construction
or manufacture), and such plans would not alert the reasonably prudent contractor to any danger. Predictably, negligence's child has come
of age in the context of strict product liability actions because some
courts have extended this principle to absolve nondesigning manufacturers of liability for design defects.' Other courts, recognizing that
fault principles play no part in strict product liability actions, have rejected the "defense." 50
Case law dealing with the contract specification defense in strict
product liability suits involving government contracts for military hardware is sparse, but the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has rejected the
defense in one case. The defendant manufacturer in Challoner v. Day

45.

The relevance of insurance is considered fully herein at notes 14-47 and accompanying

text.
46. See infra notes 47-184 and accompanying text.
47. Comment, Liability of a Manufacturer for Products Defectively Designed by the Government, 23 B.C.L. RaV. 1025, 1027 (1982).
48. In Ryan v. Feeny & Sheehan Bldg. Co., 239 N.Y. 43, 145 N.E. 321 (1924), the collapse of a canopy built pursuant to government plans killed plaintiff's decedent. The court held
that the contractor's reliance upon the plans absolved it of liability unless the plans were so apparently defective that an ordinary builder of ordinary prudence would be put on notice that the work
was likely to cause injury. For a more recent restatement of the rule in a product liability action,
see Lenherr v. N.R.M. Corp., 504 F. Supp. 165 (D. Kan. 1980). In Lenherr, the court held that a
manufacturer is liable in negligence only if the defect in design is sufficiently obvious to alert a
reasonably competent manufacturer to the danger. Id. at 174.
49. See, e.g., Spangler v. Kranco, Inc., 481 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1973); Union Supply Co. v.
Pust, 196 Colo. 162, 583 P.2d 276 (1978) (private contract). See generally Comment, supra note
4.
50. See, e.g., Lenherr, 504 F. Supp. at 174.
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& Zimmerman, Inc."" argued that it could not be held liable for a design defect in a round of ammunition which prematurely exploded because the government had exclusive control over the design, and the
contractor was entitled to rely upon the design of the government unless it was so glaringly or obviously dangerous that the contractor
should have been alerted to the risk of danger." The court recognized
that the rule set forth the contractor's standard of care in a negligence
action, and therefore was not applicable in a strict product liability
action.5 3
The viability of this defense in strict product liability actions is
questionable and should not prove to be a stumbling block in the majority of jurisdictions. The courts which have recognized the defense
have set forth no reasons for extending the principle to strict product
liability suits" and have basically conceded that they are employing
the same standard to determine whether the design is defective in strict
liability actions that they utilize to determine the breach of duty issue
in negligence actions. 56 Considering the availability of contribution and
indemnity, the injection of the principle into strict liability actions is
unwarranted. However, its existence should be considered when analyzing the case law because courts do not always distinguish between this
doctrine and the government contract defense."
B.

The Government Contract Defense

Assuming that the contract specification defense has not come into
play to bar the plaintiff's action, the second hurdle is the government
contract defense. This doctrine, applicable only in public contract
cases, permits a manufacturer which has complied with government
specifications to escape liability by sharing the government's immunity
for public policy reasons? 7
Historically, government contractors enjoyed limited immunity in
actions against them for damages arising from the performance of fed-

51. 512 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1975), vacated on choice of law grounds, 423 U.S. 3 (1975).
52. Id. at 82.
53. Id. at 83.
54. See, e.g., Spangler, 481 F.2d at 375 n.2 (quoting Chestnut v. Ford Motor Co., 445 F.2d
967 (4th Cir. 1971)). The standard of care imposed upon the manufacturer is "essentially the
same whether the theory of liability is labeled . . . negligence or strict tort liability." Id.
55. See, e.g., McCabe Powers Body Co. v. Sharp, 594 S.W.2d 592 (Ky. 1980) (court relied
upon a case which failed to distinguish between negligence and strict liability theories, while noting that the defense might not apply when the defect is "extraordinarily dangerous").
56. For example, the court in Jenkins v. Whittaker Corp., 551 F. Supp. 110 (D. Hawaii
1982), relied upon Challoner and Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chem. Corp., 91 N.J. 386, 451
A.2d 179 (1982), both of which involved the contract specification defense, in determining the
applicability of the government contract defense. Jenkins, 551 F. Supp. at 114.
57. See Infra notes 58-184 and accompanying text.
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eral public works projects such as bridge, road and sewer construction.58 In the seminal case of Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Construction
Co.,59 the United States Supreme Court first recognized that a contractor could avoid liability by reason of its government contract. The
plaintiff in Yearsley sought compensation for property damage allegedly caused by the defendant's work in constructing dikes for the federal government," upon the theory that the damage amounted to a taking of his property without just compensation in violation of the fifth
amendment.61 The Court absolved the contractor on the basis that it
had acted as an agent of the government, 62 while indicating that liability would attach if the contractor's authority had not been validly delegated or if the contractor had exceeded its authority. 6" Many of the
cases following Yearsley have also been inverse condemnation cases in
which the result was based upon an agency rationale with little discussion on the difference between an independent contractor and an
agent." The FTCA, enacted after Yearsley, provides for vicarious liability when a corporation acts primarily as an agent of the United
States, but expressly excludes "any contractor with the United States"
from that category."5
The principle that has evolved from this line of public works cases
provides that the contractor is not liable for damages resulting necessarily from the performance of the contract, but is liable if the damage
arises from the negligent manner in which the work is performed."
This is a restatement of the Yearsley principle that the contractor remains liable for acts outside the scope of the agency relationship. Consequently, if the damage arises from the nature of the plans as opposed

58. See infra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
59. 309 U.S. 18 (1940).
60. Id. at 19.
61. Id. at 19-20.
62. Id. at 20-21.
63. Id.
64. See, e.g.. Green v. ICI Am., Inc., 362 F. Supp. 1263 (E.D. Tenn. 1973); Dolphin Gardens, Inc. v. United States, 243 F. Supp. 824 (D. Conn. 1965). But see Powell v. United States
Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497 (1950). in which the Court found that a contractor was independent
for purposes of liability under the Fair Labor Standards Act. The contractor in Powell operated a
munitions plant pursuant to a government contract. The government supplied the materials and
owned the land, plant, equipment, and products. However, the contract expressly stated that the
contractor was not a government agent. The Court also refused to apply agency principles in a
case in which the plaintiff's decedent was killed aboard a government-owned ship operated by the
defendant pursuant to a government contract. See also Brady v. Roosevelt Steamship Co., 317
U.S. 575 (1943). The Court distinguished Yearsley by finding a negligent exercise of the power
delegated to the defendant. Id. at 583. The Court assumed that the government would indemnify
the contractor.
65. 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1982).
66. by
Green,
362 F. Supp.
at 1265.
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to the negligent performance of the work embodied in the plans, the
contractor is not liable. 7 In the past decade, however, the government
contract defense has taken on a new meaning in absolving manufacturers from liability for design defects in military products in both negligence and strict liability actions.6 8
The government contract defense was first raised in Whitaker v.
Harvell-Kilgore Corp.,69 and again five years later in Foster v. Day &
Zimmermann, Inc.70 Both cases involved the premature explosion of
certain hand grenades. The plaintiff in Whitaker, an Army private,
sought recovery from the manufacturer of the grenade, Day & Zimmermann, Inc., and the manufacturer of the fuse, Harvell-Kilgore Corporation, under negligence, breach of warranty, and strict product liability theories.7 1 Day & Zimmermann, Inc. moved to dismiss on the
ground that it functioned only as an instrumentality of the United
States, because the government owned the site, plant, materials and
finished products, while Day & Zimmermann, Inc. merely assembled
the component parts according to government specifications . 2 The
court relied upon Powell v. United States Cartridge Co. 7 3 to reject the
grenade manufacturer's claim that it was a government instrumentality. The Court in Powell held that the operator of the subject munitions plant at that time was not a government agent.7 4 Since Powell
and Whitaker both involved the same munitions plant, the Whitaker
Court held that Day & Zimmermann was also not a government
agent.7 5 Additionally, the government contract in both cases expressly
stated that the contractor was an independent contractor and not a government agent. 6
Thereafter, in Foster v. Day & Zimmermann, Inc.,77 an Army reservist brought suit against the same defendants, again seeking recovery for the premature explosion of a hand grenade on the theory of
strict liability in tort; the defendants again raised the government contract defense.7 8 The court relied upon the Whitaker court's finding that

67.

Merritt, Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 295 F.2d 14, 16 (9th Cir.

1961).
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

See infra notes 82-134 and accompanying text.
418 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1969).
502 F.2d 867 (8th Cir. 1974).
Whitaker, 418 F.2d at 1012.
Id. at 1012-13.
339 U.S. 497 (1950).
Id. at 504-08.
Witaker. 418 F.2d at 1014.
Id. The contract also contained an indemnification clause. Id.
502 F.2d 867 (8th Cir. 1974).

873.

78. Id. at
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no agency relationship existed7 9 and the additional fact that the injury
was caused by a manufacturing defect8" to reject the defendant's argument. Consequently, even if the contractor had been an agent in this
case, the Yearsley doctrine would not have applied to absolve the contractor of liability for what was akin to negligent performance of the
work.
1. The Elements of the Defense
The courts in the cases arising in the decade after Whitaker and
Foster have extended the government contract defense to suits based
upon negligence, strict liability, and breach of warranty, with or without reliance upon the Yearsley agency rationale. 81 The most commonly
required elements of the defense are: (1) the United States is immune
from liability; (2) the United States established or approved the specifications for the defective item; (3) the item conformed to the specifications; and, (4) the contractor warned the United States about the dangers involved in the use of the item. However, the courts do not
uniformly require these elements. For example, the sum of the doctrine
under Pennsylvania law is that the contractor must "execute the government's specifications carefully." ' 2
The first element, the requirement that the government be immune, is implicit in the majority of decisions. 83 However, one court has
79. Id.
80. Id. at 874 n.5. The court stated: "The doctrine of sovereign immunity may not be extended to cover the fault of a private corporation, no matter how intimate its connection with the
government." Id. at 874.
81. See infra notes 82-184 and accompanying text.
82. Brown v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 696 F.2d 246, 254 (3d Cir. 1982). The federal court
noted that it preferred requirements of compulsion, of compliance with a mandatory specification,
and of a duty to warn of dangers unknown to the government, but was bound by the current status
of Pennsylvania law. Id. at 254 & n.17. See also Casabianca v. Casabianca, 104 Misc. 2d 348,
428 N.Y.S.2d 400 (Sup. Ct. 1980) (the court simply stated that conformance with government
specifications in time of war is a complete defense to any action based upon design, including both
negligence and strict liability actions). The duty to warn requirement first arose in In re "Agent
Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 534 F. Supp. 1046, 1055 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) and therefore
was not required by courts in earlier cases such as Casablanca and Sanner v. Ford Motor Co., 144
N.J. Super. 1, 364 A.2d 43 (Law Div. 1976) (contractor having no discretion with respect to
installation of seat belts in Army jeep and who strictly complied with government specifications
cannot be held liable), aff'd, 154 N.J. Super. 407, 381 A.2d 805 (App. Div. 1977), certification
denied, 75 N.J. 616, 384 A.2d 846 (1978).
83. See, e.g., McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 448 (9th Cir. 1983) (United
States immune from direct tort liability and tort indemnification of contractors for deaths of two
Navy pilots killed when aircraft ejection system malfunctioned), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 711
(1984); Brown, 696 F.2d at 253 (contractor should share the government's privilege); Johnston v.
United States, 568 F. Supp. 351, 356 (D. Kan. 1983) (defense allows the contractor to share the
government's immunity)(citing Comment, Liability of a Manufacturerfor Products Defectively
Designed by the Government, 23 B.C.L. Rev. 1025 (1982)); Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertol, 553 F.
Supp. 340, 342 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (imposing liability on contractor when government is immune is
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expressly labeled it an element."
The second element of the defense requires proof that the United
States set or approved the specifications for the item. The extent of the
government's control over the specifications is the crucial factor." The
courts have not agreed upon a uniform standard for determining when
the defendant's involvement in the design process precludes the use of
the defense. However, a few courts" have relied upon the formulation
of elements the court set forth in In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation.8 7 The "Agent Orange" litigation resulted from the use of
a chemical herbicide by United States military forces in Vietnam
where millions of American servicemen were exposed to the lethal
toxin." The plaintiffs' attorneys alleged that the manufacturers had
marketed the herbicide since 1948,89 and that the military specifications were drawn up from information supplied by the defendants."
The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the government contract defense required that the defendant manufacturers prove that
they had no responsibility, direct or indirect, for formulation of the
specifications.91 Instead, the court stated that the defense required only
meaningless) (quoting Dolphin, 243 F. Supp. at 827). The government always retains its sovereign
immunity in strict liability actions. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
84. McKay, 704 F.2d at 451.
85. The fact that the defendant, Boeing Company, had final control over the design of the
transmission of a helicopter was the decisive factor in the jury's verdict for the plaintiffs in a
recent product liability action. Lauter, A Liability Defense Shapes Up, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 12, 1983,
at 3, col. 1. Transmission problems in the Army CH-47 Chinook helicopter caused it to crash in
late 1982, killing all forty-six people aboard. Id. While the defendant argued that the government
set the transmission design, the plaintiffs argued that Boeing had initially created the specifications and that the government had merely adopted them. Id. The jury found that Boeing had final
control over the design in response to a special interrogatory. Id.
Other courts acknowledge that the relative control of the parties over the design is a determinative factor. For example, the court in one case denied the defendant's motion for summary
judgment on liability upon finding that material issues of fact remained with respect to the defendant's involvement in or responsibility for the design of an atomic simulator. Jenkins v. Whittaker
Corp., 551 F. Supp. 110, 114 (D. Hawaii 1982). The court went on to grant the plaintiff's motion
in limine prohibiting the defendant from raising the government contract defense in the strict
product liability action. Id. See also In re Related Asbestos Cases, 543 F. Supp. 1142, 1152 (N.D.
Cal. 1982) (court implied that the fact that some defendants did not specifically manufacture
asbestos products in accordance with government specifications, but rather supplied the Navy with
the same products it used to fill nonmilitary orders, might bar use of the defense); Sanner, 154
N.J. Super. at 409, 381 A.2d at 806 (since defendant had no discretion with respect to installation
of seatbelts, defendant is not liable).
86. See infra notes 87-110 and accompanying text.
87. 534 F. Supp. 1046 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
88. Comment, Agent Orange and the Government Contract Defense: Are Military Manufacturers Immune from Products Liability?, 36 U. MIAMI L. REv 489, 490 (1982).
89. Yannacone, Kavenagh & Searcy, Dioxin Molecule of Death, TRIAL, Dec. 1981, at 30,
34.
90. Id. at 32.
91. 534 F. Supp. at 1056.
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that the defendants prove that the government established the design;
"that the product

. . .

supplied was a particular product specified by

the government. If it should appear that the contract set forth merely a
'performance specification', as opposed to a specified product, then
the
government contract defense would be far more restricted." ' " This formulation amounts to a requirement that the government set design
specifications.
On the other hand, a few courts have not required that the government create design specifications, but only that the government approve
reasonably precise specifications. The court in McKay v. Rockwell International Corp."3 stated the test as follows: "The supplier [must
prove] that the United States established, or approved, reasonably precise specifications for the allegedly defective military equipment.""
The court remanded the case for the lower court to determine this issue
after the plaintiffs contended that the United States had merely requested, by letter, that Rockwell design a new ejection system (the
component at issue) and had agreed, in advance, to purchase
Rockwell's product as completely designed." Cases where the government agrees, in advance, to accept whatever the manufacturer designs,
thereby precluding a finding that the approval was of "reasonably precise specifications," would presumably be rare and the McKay test routinely satisfied.
Not all courts follow these formulations. For example, the court in
Jenkins v. Whittaker Corp." found that the test employed by the court
in "Agent Orange" applied only to weapons manufactured during war.
It accordingly held that "some involvement" by the manufacturer in
the design of a nonwartime product was sufficient to avoid granting the
defendants' motion for summary judgment on the basis of the government contract defense. 7
While government practices in awarding military contracts would
appear to preclude manufacturers from meeting the stricter "Agent Orange" test in the majority of instances, the sparsity of cases in which

92. Id. Other courts have also followed this definition of the element. See, e.g., Koutsoubos,
553 F. Supp. at 343; Asbestos, 543 F. Supp. at 1152.
93. 704 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1982).
94. Id. at 451. See also Hubbs v. United Technologies, 574 F. Supp. 96, 99 (E.D. Pa. 1983)
(defendant precluded from using defense if it cannot prove that the government either set specifications which amounted to more than a general outline or approved defendant's final reasonably
detailed specifications; the court went on to cite the stricter "Agent Orange" test as the equivalent
of the McKay test and appeared to utilize the former test).
95. McKay, 704 F.2d at 453.
96. 551 F. Supp. 110 (D. Hawaii 1982).
97. Id. at 114.
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the courts have addressed the issue provide inconclusive information."
The fact that the government awards the majority of contracts through
the negotiation process" and merely approves, as opposed to creates,
the contractor's proposed design means that the government has not
established the design specifications in these cases. In such cases, the
contractors could not meet the "Agent Orange" test, but could meet
the McKay test.
The third element requires that the item conform to the government's specifications, precluding immunity for manufacturing defects.
The court in "Agent Orange" required that the product meet the specifications in "all material respects." 10 0 The "material respects" are those
design aspects alleged to be defective.10 1 Proof that the government 1in02
spected the product and accepted it is sufficient to meet this element.
The court in McKay again created a less stringent requirement. The
court stated that the equipment must conform to reasonably precise
specifications approved by the government,1 03 but found that the defendants had met their burden of proof by the allegation of a design defect
as opposed to a manufacturing defect. 10
Finally, the court in "Agent Orange" required that the defendant
prove that the government knew as much as, or more than, the defendant about the hazards associated with the use of the product.108 This
element imposes a duty upon the defendant to warn of those hazards
arising from the specifications which the defendant knew and the government did not know. The element is grounded in the rationale that
the government's decision to use the product might have changed based

98. Hubbs, 574 F. Supp. at 99 (Naval officer in charge of design work on aircraft testified
that the Navy created specifications, while an engineer for defendant testified that the defendant
created detailed specifications which the Navy approved); Koutsoubos, 553 F. Supp. at 343 (government created specifications for allegedly defective system); Sanner, 154 N.J. Super. at 409,
381 A.2d at 806 (government created specifications expressly precluding seat belts, the alleged
defect, and solicited bids).
99. See supra note 12. See also Comment, Requests for Proposals in State Government
Procurement, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 179, 181 (1981) (citing COMM'N ON GOV'T PROCUREMENT, 1
REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON

GOV'T

PROCUREMENT

20 & n.25 (1972) for the fact that eight-five

to ninety percent of all federal contract dollars spent in 1980 were dispensed through negotiated
procurement). However, the manufacturers claim that the government prefers advertised contracts. Industry Groups, supra note 41, at 693.
100. 534 F. Supp. at 1055. Courts following this formulation include Hubbs, 574 F. Supp.
at 98; Koulsoubos, 553 F. Supp. at 342; and Asbestos, 543 F. Supp. at 1152.
101. Koutsoubos, 553 F. Supp. at 343.
102. Id. at 344; Hubbs, 574 F. Supp. at 100.
103. McKay, 704 F.2d at 451.
104. Id. at 453.
105. "Agent Orange," 534 F. Supp. at 1055. See also McCrae v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp.,
97 F.R.D. 490, 493 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Hubbs, 574 F. Supp. at 98; Koutsoubos, 553 F. Supp. at
342; Asbestos, 543 F. Supp. at 1152.
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upon its knowledge of these hazards. 106 The duty only extends to those
hazards that "might reasonably have affected the government's decision" about the use of the product. 107 The defendant's participation in
the preparation of the specifications is relevant in establishing the relative degrees of knowledge of the parties.108 The McKay court stated
that the defense required that the defendants warn the government
about "patent errors" in the specifications or about dangers involved in
the use of the product which the defendant knew, but the government
did not.109 The court expressed the same rationale for imposition of this
duty as the court in "Agent Orange" did: enabling the government to
balance the risks and benefits inherent in the use of the equipment. 110
While eight 1 courts have recognized the government contract defense as a viable defense (six since the 1982 "Agent Orange" decision 12 ), two courts have rejected it. The court in Jenkins v. Whittaker
Corp.113 prohibited the defendant from arguing the defense to the jury.
The court relied heavily on facts in the case which showed that the
defendant had "some involvement" in the design process. 11' However,
it appeared to reject the defense as a matter of law'1 5 after a discussion
of a case involving a possible manufacturing defect, 1 one involving a
private contract,117 and after deciding that the "Agent Orange" holding
should be limited to products manufactured for war.118

106. "Agent Orange," 534 F. Supp. at 1057.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1056; Hubbs, 574 F. Supp. at 100; Koutsoubos, 553 F. Supp. at 344.
109. McKay, 704 F.2d at 451.
110. This duty should encourage all manufacturers to warn the government of potential
hazards due to the possibility of a later claim, although some may remain reluctant to do so for
fear of losing the contract. For a good example of a case in which the manufacturer, a subcontractor, allegedly failed to notify the government out of fear of such a loss, see Vandiver, The Aircraft

Brake Scandal, HARPER'S

MAO.

45 (Apr. 1972).

111. McKay, 704 F.2d at 451; Brown, 696 F.2d at 251; Hubbs, 574 F. Supp. at 98; McCrae, 97 F.R.D. at 492; Koutsoubos, 553 F. Supp. at 342; "Agent Orange," 534 F. Supp. at 1053;
Sanner, 154 N.J. Super. at 409, 381 A.2d at 806; Casabianca,104 Misc. 2d at 350, 428 N.Y.S.2d
at 402.
Courts have also recognized that the defense is available in cases which involve claims for
damages due to asbestos-related injuries. See Tefft v. A.C. & S., Inc., No. C-30-924M (W.D.
Wash. Sept. 15, 1982); Asbestos, 543 F. Supp. at 1152.
112. The two courts which recognized the defense prior to the 1982 "Agent Orange" decision are the Sanner court and the the Casabiancacount.
113. 551 F. Supp. 110 (D. Hawaii 1982).
114. Id. at 114-15.
115. Id. at 114.
116. The court cited Challoner v. Day & Zimmermann, Inc., 512 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1975),
vacated on choice of law grounds, 423 U.S. 3 (1976) as a helpful case. See supra notes 51-53 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Challoner.
117. Michalko, 91 N.J. 386, 451 A.2d 179.
118. Jenkins, 551 F. Supp. at 114.
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The court in Johnston v. United States1"' also rejected the defense
as unwarranted in that case.120 The court traced the history of the defense from the original cases involving claims against public works contractors for property damage through the recent extension of the de121
fense into personal injury suits grounded on strict product liability.
The court found that the reasons advanced by courts which had recognized the defense were inapplicable under the circumstances of Johnston. The plaintiffs in Johnston, four former employees of a company
which overhauled aircraft instruments, contended that they contracted
cancer or leukemia through their exposure to ionizing radiation emitted
from the face of instruments the company overhauled. 1 22 The defendants included the government, eight manufacturers of the instruments,
and fifteen defendants which had sent the instruments to the employer
for repair.1 2 8 Two of the manufacturer-defendants moved for summary
judgment because they produced the aircraft instruments pursuant to
wartime government contracts. The theories of action included a claim
1 24
of strict product liability for a design defect and failure to warn.
The Johnston court addressed, and found inapplicable, five rationales advanced for the defense. First, the court conceded that the government contract defense could minimize the risk to national security
that might be created by judicial second-guessing of military design
when the allegedly defective product was a new and technically complex one used only by the military. 5 However, the court found that
rationale unpersuasive when applied to an item like the one at issue in
an adaptation or copy of an item already
Johnston, which was simply
126
commerce.
sold in private
Second, the Johnston court rejected the justification that government costs for military products would increase absent the defense because contractors would pass their litigation expenses on to the government through higher bids. The court reasoned that manufacturers were
already passing on the costs of liability for manufacturing defects, and
there was no principled way to distinguish the costs for manufacturing
defects from those for design defects for purposes of the increased-cost
rationale. Hence it was patently unfair for a few, innocent, randomly-

119.
120.
cases did
121.
122.
123.
124.

568 F. Supp. 351 (D. Kan. 1983).
Id. at 357. The court stated that the policies that might justify the defense in other
not justify it in that case. Id. at 356-57.
Id. at 356.
Id. at 353.
Id.
Id. at 354.

125. Id. at 357. The court in McKay also recognized an exception for an ordinary consumer
product, such as a can of beans. McKay, 704 F.2d at 451.
126. Johnston, 568 F. Supp. at 357.
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selected victims to bear the entire loss for design defects when all taxpayers shared the loss for manufacturing defects.127 Moreover, the
court reasoned that imposing liability on the contractors could help
control government defense costs because the manufacturers with better safety records could procure lower premiums for liability insurance,
and hence make lower bids than their counterparts who paid higher
1 8
premiums. 2
A third rationale for the government contract defense is that it is
inequitable to impose liability on a contractor for a defect in a product
the government forced it to produce. The court acknowledged this was
a "powerful justification," but found that the defendants were not compelled to produce the item at issue. 29 The court also sidestepped the
argument that imposing liability on the contractors undermines the policies underlying governmental immunity pursuant to the Feres doctrine
or the discretionary function exception.130 The court found Feres inapplicable because the plaintiffs were not service personnel; the discretionary function exception was held equally inapplicable because the
court was not convinced that the government could invoke it. " '
Finally, the Johnston court rejected the contention that it is unfair
to subject a manufacturer to liability when the manufacturer is not
culpable. The court noted that the manufacturer is often not an innocent party, especially when it has had substantial input into the product's design.13 ' Moreover, the court saw the defense operating to replace one unfairness (the manufacturer's liability) with another
unfairness (the plaintiff's inability to recover). The court saw a solution
to these inequities in the state's comparative fault scheme which apportioned liability in strict product liability suits between all "responsible"
parties, whether or not immune.133
In addition to the opinion of the court in Johnston, the dissenting
judge in McKay'" also attacked the rationales underlying the government contract defense. The remaining courts confronted by the defense,
however, have justified it as sound policy. "

127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 357-58.
130. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text regarding the Fetes doctrine and the
discretionary function exception.
131. Johnston, 568 F. Supp. at 358.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 358-59.
134. 704 F.2d at 456 (Alarcon, J., dissenting).
135. Several courts have rejected the government contract defense in cases which involve
claims for asbestos-related injuries, either as a matter of law or upon the facts presented. E.g.,
Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. v. United States, No. 79-0382 (D. Hawaii Oct. 20, 1983); Plas v.
Published by eCommons,
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The Policy Justifications for the Defense

Assuming that the contract specification defense has not barred
6
the plaintiff's strict product liability action,"' and that the plaintiff established a prima facie case, the plaintiff would recover for his or her
injuries absent the government contract defense. As noted, the courts
which have recognized the government contract defense have done so
based upon policy reasons which are absent in strict liability suits that
do not contain the elements of the defense.
A frequently cited reason for the defense is that imposition of liability on the manufacturer will escalate the manufacturer's costs, the
3 7 and such a shift
increased costs will be shifted to the government,
3 8 This reawould render the government's immunity "meaningless."'
soning assumes manufacturer costs would increase due to either an unavailability of product liability insurance or the rising cost of insurance
premiums. As one court speculated, cost shifting could be accomplished
by way of cost overrun provisions or increased prices in later contracts.' 3 9 Ultimately, the government becomes indirectly liable al40
though it has not waived its immunity, and the government pays for
exercising its direction in making design decisions. The difficulties with
this rationale are multifaceted.
A primary flaw in this reasoning is that imposition of liability has
no appreciable effect on the cost of operating the manufacturer's business. The most comprehensive recent study on product liability insurance indicates that the existence or nonexistence of the government
contract defense has little effect on the manufacturer's rates.' The
rates for product liability insurance are based largely on intangible factors as opposed to actuarial considerations such as number or size of
claims. The real impact of actuarial analysis on the final rate is mini-

mal. 42 Moreover, insurance premiums do not account for a large per-

Raymark Indus., Inc., No. C-78-946 (N.D. Ohio May 3, 1983); Nobriga v. Johns-Manville Sales
Corp., No. 55624 (Hawaii Cir. Ct. May 24, 1982); Hammond v. North Am. Asbestos Corp., 97
Ill. 2d 195, 454 N.E.2d 210 (1983).
136. See supra notes 48-56 and accompanying text.
137. McKay, 704 F.2d at 449; Hubbs, 574 F. Supp. at 98; Koutsoubos, 553 F. Supp. at 342
(quoting Dolphin, 243 F. Supp. at 827).
138. Koutsoubos, 553 F. Supp. at 342 (quoting Dolphin, 243 F. Supp. at 827).
139. McKay, 704 F.2d at 449.
140. While the McKay court limited its reasoning to the prospect that the Feres doctrine
would be subverted, the rationale would extend to all instances where the government is immune.
Id. at 449-5 1.
141. INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FINAL
REPORT OF THE INSURANCE STUDY 1-40 (1977). The study reported that: "In the overwhelming
majority of cases, insurance company sources did not rely on data (either in terms of number or
size of claims) to support premium increases that occurred in the 1974-1976 period." Id. at 1-22.
142. Id.
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centage of the manufacturer's overall operating costs. For example,
product liability insurance costs amounted to only two percent of the
general sales from 1969 to 1973 of the thirty-five companies which
manufactured over ninety percent of all aviation aircraft, engines, avionics, supplies, and components. 48 In most cases, the average cost
amounted to less than one percent of the sales.1 Consequently, even if
the government contract defense were a factor considered in setting
rates, the added cost would be a minimal percentage of the contractor's
total bid.
Additionally, contractor complaints that product liability insurance is unavailable 1" are without substance. The previously cited study
on product liability insurance concluded that "there is no widespread
problem of product liability insurance being unavailable."1' 6 Another
study of the twenty-three major insurers representing most of the product liability business in the United States confirmed that ninety-seven
percent of the total bodily injury claims made from July 1, 1976,
through March 15, 1977, were covered by insurance. 4
Regardless of whether operating costs will escalate, contractors
admit that they are unable to shift costs through increased prices. Contractors cite factors such as the government's preference for fixed
prices and advertised contracts, statutory requirements for certification
of cost and pricing data, and the government's perennial funding constraints as all precluding increased prices.1 48
A third factor which militates against the "increased costs, costshifting" rationale is that costs presently reflect the absence of the government contract defense. The defense was not recognized in personal
injury cases until the past two years,1 while strict product liability
surfaced in the early 1960's.15o Without the defense, the manufactur-

143.
144.

Id. at 1-21.
INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
FINAL

REPORT XXXvii

(1978).

145. Industry Groups. supra note 41, at 694 (testimony of Electronics Industries
Association President Peter F. McCloskey). McCloskey urged Congress to recognize that
the potential
liability involved in some government contracts exceeds the contractor's ability to
pay and therefore urged Congress to enact legislation which would require the government to
indemnify the
contractor when the damages are beyond the coverage of reasonably available insurance
coverage.
Id. Twenty percent of the top one hundred military contractors are electronics firms.
As Defense
Billions Pour into the Economy, supra note 1, at 58.

146.
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supra note 144, at xxxv.

147. Insurance Services Office Product Liability Closed Claim Survey: A Technical
Analysis of Survey Results Highlights (1977) (on file with University of Dayton Law Review).
148. Industry Groups, supra note 41, at 693-94 (testimony of T. Richard Brown).
149. But see supra note 112 and accompanying text.
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ers' rates should not vary at all. With the defense, the rates should
decrease.
Disregarding the weaknesses of the rationale, it is arguably specious to conclude that shifting costs would render the government's immunity "meaningless." This conclusion implies that the objective of
sovereign immunity is to cut government costs. While lower costs are
certainly a by-product of the doctrine, they are not an objective, as is
illustrated by the types of cases where the government has waived its
immunity and those where it has not. For example, there is no reason
1 51
to believe that claims for the negligent transmission of letters or for
52 are any greater
damages caused by the imposition of a quarantine
than claims for the negligent operation of an automobile, but the government has waived its immunity for the latter claim and retained it
for the two former claims. Moreover, the government contract defense
itself is not predicated upon the costs to the government, as it precludes
liability for design defects, but does not preclude liability for manufacturing defects. 15 3 Logically, the defense should cover both types if lower
costs are at issue, as the amount of the claim for one does not vary
from the amount of the claim for the other, while the manufacturer is
presumably passing off the costs of both to the government. Accordingly, the lack of a government contract defense cannot undermine sovereign immunity simply because the government may be indirectly
shouldering costs which it would not directly bear due to its immunity.
Proponents of the defense also assume that the effect of these increased costs of liability will undermine the policies underlying sovereign immunity. In fact, no policy justification for sovereign immunity in
the three relevant areas where it has been retained is impinged by denying the government contract defense. First, the absence of the defense does not undermine the discretionary function exception. This exception is designed to enhance separation of powers by curtailing
judicial interference with the decision-making process of the other two
branches.'" Congress feared that the courts would substitute their
judgment for that of the government official in determining the propriety of a discretionary act and thereby inhibit the official's freedom of
choice.1 55 The courts, and not the other two branches, could effectively
dictate social policy absent the exception. Case law has recognized this
rationale by acknowledging that judicial review is appropriate when

151. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(b) (1982).

152. Id.§ 2680(0.
153. See supra text accompanying notes 100-04.
154. Payton v. United States, 636 F.2d 132, 142-43 & n.25 (5th Cir. 1981).
155. Tort Claims: Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463 Before Comm. on the Judiciary,
77th Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1942).
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"the question is not negligence but social wisdom.",," However, this
policy is only remotely implicated when the government is not the defendant. While the courts may need to second-guess the judgment of
the official who decided, for a myriad of reasons, to utilize the allegedly
defective design in some cases in order to determine whether it was an
unreasonably dangerous design, the manufacturer and not the government is being held accountable in these cases. The feared judicial control of the decision-making processes would hardly result from a slight
increase in bid costs on government contracts. The deterrent effect of
this increase would seem to be too remote to be of any significance. The
courts daily make decisions which have an indirect economic impact on
the government.
Additionally, the defense requires that the manufacturer warn the
government of hazards which the manufacturer had discovered, but
which were unknown to the government.15 7 This requirement will result
in increased costs that will have the same impact on the government as
if no defense at all existed, while the discretionary nature of the government's decision would be the same whether the defendant warned it
or not. The defense, tailored to protect the innocent manufacturer, was
obviously not fashioned to protect the discretionary decisions of the
government. Indeed, the fact that the defense has existed for the past
quarter of a century without any noticeable circumvention of the discretionary function exception militates against the theory that the lack
of the defense undermines the exception.
The second relevant area where the government has retained its
immunity is in cases covered by the Feres doctrine." The lack of the
government contract defense also fails to undermine the rationales supporting this exception. First, the Court in Feres recognized that the
relationship between the government and service personnel is federal in
nature so that the government's liability should not depend on the "fortuity" of where the soldier was stationed at the time of the injury and
the applicable law. 1 ' While the court in McKay v. Rockwell International Corp. feared that the failure to create a government contract
defense would "subject the United States indirectly to paying for damages to injured servicemen, where the amount of damages would vary
depending on the applicable law," 1 0 the extreme remoteness of the
connection between the increased costs to the government and the variation in the amount of damages renders this a fairly insignificant intru156. Blessing v. United States, 447 F. Supp. 1160, 1170 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
157. See supra notes 105-10 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
159. Feres, 340 U.S. at 143.
160.by McKay,
740 F.2d
at 449 & n.8.
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sion on this rationale for the Feres doctrine. Moreover, the government
is already presumably paying for the increased costs of the manufacturer's liability to service personnel for manufacturing defects, which
vary depending upon the situs of the injury. Hence, the defense is again
too narrowly fashioned to fulfill the objective.
A second factor cited by the Feres Court was that the Veteran's
Benefit Act 1 1 establishes a no-fault scheme which provides generous
pensions to injured service personnel without regard to the government's negligence.1 62 Even assuming that this act fairly compensates
8
service personnel, and that FECA 1 fairly compensates civilian employees, the defense also precludes plaintiffs who have no remedy
against the government from recovering any damages. In this regard,
the defense is overly broad. The final relevant government immunity is
from liability in strict product liability suits.'" The rationale for this
immunity is not completely clear. The courts have relied on statutory
6
construction of the FTCA in recognizing immunity.1 5
In summary, the defense cannot be justified upon the rationale
that it is necessary in order to avoid indirect usurpation of the government's immunity through a shifting of costs to the government. The
defense is ill-designed for such a task, even assuming that the costs are
shifted to the government.
A second reason which the courts have cited in support of the government contract defense is that trials concerning design defects where
government specifications are at issue would require second-guessing
military orders, and would often require military personnel to testify
about one another's actions. 116 Arguably, these trials would affect mili16 7
tary discipline as well as national security. One court which has rejected the defense admitted that this rationale had "some force" when
the product at issue is technologically complex, such as the aircraft
ejection seat in McKay, but found it inapplicable when the product10 8is
an adaption or copy of one already available to private consumers.
The second-guessing of military decisions would stem from the determination of whether the product contained a design defect. That is,
whether the product was unreasonably dangerous for its intended use.
This factor would not seem to be a valid concern in many cases where
161. 38 U.S.C. §§ 101-5228 (1982).
162. Fetes, 340 U.S. at 143.
163. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
165. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
166. McKay, 704 F.2d at 449 (quoting Stencel Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666,
673 (1971)); Hubbs, 574 F. Supp at 98.
167. McKay, 704 F.2d at 449.
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the state of the art is the crucial issue, even when the product at issue
is technologically complex. For instance, the Navy had done extensive
testing on the allegedly defective ejection seat at issue in the McKay
case and was aware that the system created a risk of neck injuries upon
ejection. 1' Since the purpose of an ejection seat is to avoid injury to
crew members trapped inside an endangered aircraft by propelling
them from the aircraft, the Navy presumably would have preferred
that the ejection system accomplish its purpose and minimize injuries
to the extent possible. In this case, the state of the art as opposed to
military strategy was the crucial factor in the government's decision to
utilize the system. Whether the system was defective would depend
upon the jury's analysis of the technological feasibility of a better system and would not require a second opinion on military strategy.
In other cases, however, the jury would have to decide whether the
product was reasonably safe for its military use based upon evidence
about military strategy. For example, in Sanner v. Ford Motor Co., 170
the army made a calculated decision to exclude seat belts from its jeeps
in order to facilitate quick escapes."1 The national security problems
created by revelation of the strategic reasons for employing the product's design could be circumvented by prohibiting public inspection of
the court records in those rare cases where a real threat is presented.172
In addition, when classified evidence is at issue, trying the case to the
court without a jury would be helpful, assuming the constitutional
problems inherent in requiring a waiver could be overcome.
A third reason the McKay court advanced in support of the defense is that the manufacturer is unable to negotiate with the government to eliminate the risks which render the product defective.17 This
reason amounts to no reason at all: strict product liability is not based
upon fault principles. Retailers, bailors, lessors and others in the chain
of distribution that had no control over the product's design have been
held accountable for design defects upon the rationale that they are in
a better position to absorb and spread the loss than is the plaintiff.17 4
Moreover, the government rarely needs to use its statutory power to
force contractors to manufacture military equipment for a war, and

169. McKay, 704 F.2d at 454.
170. Sanner v. Ford Motor Co., 144 N.J. Super. 1, 364 A.2d 43 (Law Div. 1976), affd, 154
N.J. Super. 407, 381 A.2d 805 (App. Div. 1977), certification denied, 75 N.J. 616, 384 A.2d 846
(1978).
171. Id. at 7, 364 A.2d at 46.
172. No threat would be present in a case like Sanner, where common sense dictates that an
individual not wearing a seat belt can escape from a jeep more quickly than one not wearing a
seat belt, but some cases may involve classified information.
173. McKay, 704 F.2d at 450.
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note 4, at 91.
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even then, the manufacturer realizes a profit. The equities are clearly
with the plaintiff who has been forced to suffer physical and economic
loss due to the military effort as opposed to the contractor which may
have been coerced into producing a product, but which realizes a profit
along the way, despite product liability losses compensated by insurance. Accordingly, this "it's unfair" argument is not a compelling reason for creating the defense.
Another justification the McKay court cited is that the defense
provides incentives for suppliers of military equipment to work closely
with the military in the development of equipment. 75 While the defense obviously makes government contracts more attractive than they
would be without the defense, proponents of the defense fail to explain
why such incentives are necessary. As a spokesman for the Department
of Justice noted in opposing a bill which would provide for government
indemnification, there is "no justification for proposals which give contractors special rights or remedies which are not generally available to
others." 176 The spokesman noted that indemnification would discourage
corporate efforts to generate sophisticated technology by reducing 1the
,7
economic incentive to design the "best and safest possible products.
He also cited the fact that "considerable visible effort goes into the
competitive battle to secure an edge in receiving this business," so that
further incentives are unnecessary.1 78 Contractors also admit that the
fight for government contracts is "extremely competitive."' 179 For example, General Electric has been investing 100 million dollars a year in
engine research, an investment which helped it win a contract for work
on the Air Force's F-16 aircraft that could ultimately be worth nine
billion dollars to General Electric.180 General Electric and United
Technologies' Pratt and Whitney Aircraft had been engaged in a
seven-year struggle for military contracts, of which the F-16 aircraft
contract was a part.181 Accordingly, a fringe benefit, like the government contract defense, hardly seems necessary to encourage contractors
to enter into government contracts.
Finally, one court has argued the flip side of the increasedcosts-government-deterrent rationale: that is, no societal benefit results
from imposing liability on the contractor because the contractor is in

175. McKay, 704 F.2d at 450.
176. Industry Groups, supra note 41, at 694.
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no position to deter the government.""' The court overlooks the fact
that the compensation rationale provides a societal benefit by permitting the injured plaintiff to procure needed medical care and remain
economically productive. More importantly, the risk-spreading rationale for strict product liability exists. The manufacturer is in a position
where it can pass the cost to its insurer and the insurer can pass the
cost to its customers. Otherwise, the entire loss falls on the plaintiff,
who is unable to effectively spread the loss.
In summary, none of the justifications advanced for the defense
provide a compelling reason to create immunity for the contractor. On
the other hand, many of the reasons usually advanced for imposing
strict liability come into play in the cases where the elements of the
defense exist. Unfortunately, the clear majority of courts have recognized the government contract defense which, incidently, seems to have
sprung full grown from the pen of Judge Pratt in the "Agent Orange"
litigation, a class action involving a potential 2.4 million plaintiffs. 188
III.

ALTERNATIVES

Lobbying by government contractors has resulted in the introduction of two bills in Congress to alleviate some of the contractors' liability for injuries caused by products manufactured pursuant to government specifications. The first bill, H.R. 1504, "The Government
Contractors' Product Liability Act," provided for government indemnification.'" The Department of Justice strongly opposed the bill, arguing that contractors were not entitled to special rights, procurement
costs would skyrocket, government contracts were already a highly
competitive field, and indemnification would reduce the contractors' ec182. Koutsoubos, 553 F. Supp. at 342. Ironically, the court also cited the rationale that
increased costs to the government would render its immunity meaningless. Id.
183. Comment, supra note 88, at 490. Predictably, the defendants in the asbestos litigation
have latched onto the defense as "the only way to resolve this [litigation]." Winter, U.S. Contracts Asserted in Asbestos Litigation, 68 A.B.A. J. 790, 790 (1982) (quoting William Spriggs,
Washington attorney representing a former asbestos manufacturer). See supra notes 111-12 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the courts which have recognized that the defense is available. See also supra note 135 and accompanying text for a discussion of the courts which have
rejected the defense. At least three courts have declined to rule on the merits of the defense when
confronted with a motion for a bifurcated trial in which the first phase would involve the defense.
In re Massachusetts Asbestos Cases, M.B.L. Nos. I & 2 (D. Mass. Sept. 13, 1983); In re General
Dynamics Asbestos Cases, C.M.L. No. 1 (D. Conn. Apr. 22, 1983); McCrae v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 97 F.R.D. 490 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
One court also declined to rule on the merits of the defense when reaching its decision to
deny the plaintiff's motion to strike the defense. In re All Maine Asbestos Litig., 575 F. Supp.
1375 (D. Me. 1983). See generally Rivkin, The Government Contract Defense: A Proposalfor
the Expeditious Resolution of Asbestos Litigation, 17 FORUM 1225 (1982).
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onomic incentive to produce and design safe products.1 85 The Department of Justice clearly thought that the contractors rather than the
taxpayers ought to pay for any damages. The contractors countered
with a host of complaints: the lack of liability insurance at reasonable
costs; 186 that they are discouraged from accepting government contracts; government employees have little incentive to carefully use and
maintain equipment; an inability to pad contract prices to pass the liapass the costs off to
bility off to the government; and, an inability to
18
their customers due to a narrow customer base. 7
Consequently, a second bill, S. 1839, surfaced. It provides contractors with immunity from liability for damages due to the government's
proportion of fault, without requiring the government to pick up the
tab for its share of the damages. The sponsor of the bill touted it as the
solution to the "lack of fairness resulting from court decisions which
allow the government to avoid contributing to payment of liability by
its contractors when the government is partly or wholly at fault. ' "
Interestingly enough, the bill does not require the government to contribute anything for the damages resulting from government fault. The
bill applies only to negligence actions by government employees (directly or derivatively), and requires a reduction in the contractor's liability in proportion to the extent of the government's fault.189 Keeping
in mind the fact that the only time the contractor cannot now seek tort
indemnification from the government is when sovereign immunity bars
a direct action by the plaintiff against the government, the bill obviously does nothing to solve "the lack of fairness" the courts have allegedly created by recognizing the United States' sovereign immunity.
The bill simply bars the plaintiff from recovering from the contractor
what the plaintiff could now recover (absent the government contract
defense), without permitting the plaintiff to recover from the government. The bill amounts to a codification of a modified "government
contract defense."
Substantively, S. 1839 requires that the court consider the parties'
relative responsibility for the contract specifications and their relative
degrees of knowledge, skill, and expertise regarding the risks associated
with compliance with the specifications. 90 If the court finds that the
government was ninety-nine percent at fault for the injuries, the contractor would only be required to pay one percent of the damage
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award. The sponsor admitted that the bill was only a starting point on
the road to redressing a situation that must be altered from a "fairness
perspective." 19 1
IV.

CONCLUSION

The 1982 "'Agent Orange" decision provided the impetus for recognition of a defense which provides government contractors with total
immunity from liability for injuries caused by design defects in military
products conforming to government specifications. Neither legal precedent nor sound policy supports this judicial phenomenon that absolves
manufacturers from liability in a situation where normal tort principles
would provide for recovery. While either the contractors or the plaintiffs will end up absorbing a loss which is arguably more equitably
placed upon the federal government, the government contract defense
places the entire loss on the plaintiff, the party least able to bear or
shift it. So long as either the plaintiff or the contractor must be saddled
with the loss, the contractor should be the party upon which that burden should finally rest.
Janice M. Paulus
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